Publications
"The Use of Twitter in Arabian Gulf Countries (GCC): Public Reactions to Official Bodies’ COVID-19 Related Utterances" (with Dalal Albudaiwi, Yazeed Alhumaidi, Motassem Alfhadel, and Hesham F. Gadelrab) - Accepted in the Journal of Social Sciences
Abstract: This study aims to analyze public opinions on Twitter against COVID-19 governments’ regulations, which are informally called among people as “the new normal in the GCC in order better to understand public attitudes and concerns about COVID-19 policies.Twitter data related to COVID-19 was collected since January 2020. We used “Snscrape” library to scrape tweets and the “AraNet” package, “a deep learning toolkit for a host of Arabic social media processing,” to perform sentiment and emotional analysis. The results suggested that the textual content of the tweets reflecting people`s emotions is changing as the official bodies of GCC adopt new COVID-19-related policies and regulations. Twitter analysis of public opinions should be evaluated for adoption by governments alongside polls and other traditional ways of measuring popular attitudes.
Working papers
"The Rotating Bureaucrats Effect: Game-Theoretic Approach to Fight Corruption with Minimal Regulation"
Abstract: In certain markets where entry requires licensing, corruption, in the form of bribes, can be employed as a means by incumbents to deter potential entrants. Consequently, an analysis of firms' behaviors in such contexts can provide valuable insights to shape the design of these markets and mitigate the influence of corruption. This research aims to explore how the presence of bribery opportunities shapes firms’ behaviors, with the primary objective of enhancing market structure and diminishing the influence of corruption. Using a first-price sealed bid auction analogy, I analyze markets with an existing incumbent and one/or multiple potential entrants. My finding suggests that the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) of such games is highly sensitive to the number of potential entrants and the characteristics of the bureaucrat(s). Additionally, having at least three potential entrants, before reviewing entry applications, and maintaining bureaucrats' independence, can ensure that the incumbent won’t be able to deter any of the potential entrants from entry.
"The Social Benefit of Anonymity"
Abstract: In preparation.